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AbstractWhy study Japan? Research on contemporary Japanese politics and foreign policy faces headwinds from the relative geopolitical decline of Japan and scholars skeptical about single-country studies. An overview of Japanese politics publications in English-language journals over the past four decades suggests the subfield remains active and robust. However, there is still room to grow. I argue that Japan is a harbinger state, which experiences many challenges before others in the international system. As such, studying Japan can inform both scholars and policymakers about the political challenges other countries are likely to confront in the future. In turn, scholarship on Japan offers a critical opportunity to develop theoretical insights, assess early empirical evidence, and offer policy lessons about emerging challenges and the political contestation surrounding them. I consider the reasons why Japan so often emerges as a harbinger across issue areas and suggest areas for ongoing scholarly attention.

AbstractHow do states renegotiate their status in international organizations? I evaluate two hypotheses about renegotiation strategy choice. The first hypothesis conceptualizes renegotiation strategies as intertwined with challenger state objectives: reformist states will opt for integrative strategies – principled persuasion or strategic cooptation – while revisionist states will pursue distributive strategies – power bargaining or rhetorical coercion. The second hypothesis assumes states choose renegotiation strategies instrumentally, combining integrative and distributive strategies to maximize the likelihood of a successful alteration of the status quo. I evaluate the hypotheses by examining Japan, a country that has pursued renegotiation diplomacy across many institutional contexts. The case study evidence broadly favors the instrumental hypothesis: despite reformist objectives, Japan has often used power bargaining in tandem with integrative strategies. Contrary to the first hypothesis, Japanese objectives have not been clearly intertwined with renegotiation strategy choice. I further argue that future research should examine domestic political determinants of strategy choice, which have been important in the evolution of Japanese renegotiation diplomacy.

AbstractExisting scholarship attributes various political and economic advantages to democratic governance. These advantages may make more democratic countries prone to financial crises. Democracy is characterized by constraints on executive authority, accountability through free and fair elections, protections for civil liberties, and large winning coalitions. These characteristics bring important benefits, but they can also have unintended consequences that increase the likelihood of financial instability and crises. Using data covering the past two centuries, I demonstrate a strong relationship between democracy and financial crisis onset: on average, democracies are about twice as likely to experience a crisis as autocracies. This is an empirical regularity that is robust across a wide range of model specifications and time periods.

I propose and test a theoretical framework that explains institutional change in international relations. Like firms in markets, international institutions are affected by the underlying characteristics of their policy areas. Some policy areas are prone to produce institutions facing relatively little competition, limiting the outside options of member states and impeding redistributive change. In comparison, institutions facing severe competition will quickly reflect changes in underlying state interests and power. To test the theory empirically, I exploit common features of the Bretton Woods institutions-the International Monetary Fund and World Bank-to isolate the effect of variation in policy area characteristics. The empirical tests show that, despite having identical membership and internal rules, bargaining outcomes in the Bretton Woods institutions have diverged sharply and in accordance with the theory. Adapted from the source document.

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in 2009 promising significant transportation sector reform, but it has struggled to implement its proposals. I argue that the DPJ's initiatives faltered due to the legacy of "efficiency clientelism." Historically, Japanese transportation policy combined two imperatives: (1) encourage efficiency by raising the cost of energy-inefficient transportation, and (2) redistribute benefits to supporters of the incumbent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Because of the legacy of efficiency clientelism, DPJ campaign pledges—designed to appeal broadly to the general public by reducing transportation costs—ran up against the prospect of sharp declines in revenues and energy efficiency. Efficiency clientelism was well suited to political realities in Japan prior to the 1990s, but recent developments have undercut its viability. This raises profound questions about the sustainability of Japan's energy efficiency achievements.

This volume seeks to explain the political economy of the Abe government and the so-called 'Abenomics' economic policies. The Abe government represents a major turning point in postwar Japanese political economy. In 2019, Abe became the longest serving Prime Minister in Japanese history. Abe's government stood out not only for its longevity, but also for its policies. Abe came to power promising to reinvigorate Japan's economy under the banner of Abenomics. He pursed a host of structural reforms and industrial promotions to increase Japan's potential growth rate. Abe also achieved important legislative victories in security policy. However, the government also faced significant controversies. The book will hold appeal to scholars and students specializing in the study of Japanese politics, comparative political economy, the politics of contemporary advanced democracies, macroeconomic policy, labor market reforms, corporate governance, gender equality, agricultural reforms, energy and climate change, and East Asian security.

"The government of Shinzo Abe represents an important turning point in Japanese politics and political economy. Abe is the longest-serving Prime Minister in Japanese history, and his government has enacted important reforms under the banner of "Abenomics." In this introductory chapter, we provide a broad review of the Abe government and its policies and point out several apparent puzzles to motivate the volume."

AbstractHow does quantifying and ranking national performance influence state behavior? Cross-national assessments in education, such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) promoted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have become increasingly prominent in recent years. However, cross-national assessments are politically contentious, and their impact remains underexplored. We argue that assessment participation has a meaningful, positive impact on education outcomes and evaluate three hypotheses related to elite, domestic, and transnational mechanisms. Our mixed-method approach draws on a panel dataset covering all cross-national assessments and all countries as well as an original survey of education officials directly responsible for planning and implementation in 46 countries. We find that assessment participation increases net secondary enrollment rates even after accounting for potential self-selection. The magnitude of this increase is large: on a global basis, it is equivalent to improved access to higher education for 27–32 million students annually. The empirical evidence suggests elite-level mechanisms are primarily responsible for these findings.